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Abstract 
Self enhancement is linked to psychological gains (e.g., subjective well being, 
persistence in adversity), but also to intrapersonal and interpersonal costs (e.g., excessive risk 
taking, antisocial behavior). Thus, constraints on self enhancement may sometimes afford 
intrapersonal and interpersonal advantages. We tested whether explanatory introspection (i.e., 
generating reasons for why one might or might not possess personality traits) constitutes one 
such constraint. Experiment 1 demonstrated that explanatory introspection curtails self 
enhancement. Experiment 2 clarified that the underlying mechanism must (a) involve 
explanatory questioning rather than descriptive imagining, (b) invoke the self rather than another 
person, and (c) feature written expression rather than unaided contemplation. Finally, 
Experiment 3 obtained evidence that an increase in uncertainty about oneself mediates the effect. 
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The Why’s the Limit:  
Curtailing Self-enhancement with Explanatory Introspection 
  Most people, most of the time, see themselves through rose colored glasses. Whether 
rating themselves as above average on personality traits and abilities (Alicke, 1985) or believing 
themselves less susceptible to bias than the average person (Pronin, Yin, & Ross, 2002)—
whether showing selective recall for flattering autobiographical episodes (Sanitioso, Kunda, & 
Fong, 1990) or engaging in social comparisons that validate a positive self view (Dunning, 
1999)—whether attributing their successes internally and their failures externally (Mezulis, 
Abramson, Hyde, & Hankin, 2004) or thinking that their own future will surpass that of their 
peers (Weinstein, 1980)—people by and large evaluate themselves more favorably either than 
the objective facts warrant (Gosling, John, Craik, & Robins, 1998) or than external observers 
think justified (Epley & Dunning, 2000). Tellingly, people even believe that they outdo their 
own doppelgangers: they rate themselves more favorably than they rate their peers on the basis 
of identical behavioral evidence (Alicke, Vredenburg, Hiatt, & Govorun, 2001). Moreover, 
egocentric biases like the better than average effect are pervasive existing not only in (self 
promoting) individualistic cultures, but also in (self deprecating) collectivistic cultures 
(Sedikides, Gaertner, & Toguchi, 2003). 
  All such phenomena can be viewed as forms of self enhancement. Although perhaps 
irrational in the normative sense—half of us being forever doomed to be below average
1—self 
enhancement is nonetheless linked to substantial benefits. These include good psychological 
health (Taylor, Lerner, Sherman, Sage, & McDowell, 2003), better coping with physical illness 
(Taylor et al., 2003) and traumatic loss (Bonanno, Rennicke, & Dekel, 2005), greater persistence 
in the face of adversity (Taylor & Brown, 1988), and good social adjustment (Donnellan, 
Trzesniewski, Robins, Moffitt, & Caspi, 2005). 
  However, self enhancement is also linked to several substantial costs. Intrapersonal costs 
include imprudent risk taking (Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1993), ineffective action 
planning (Oettingen & Gollwitzer, 2001), and an increased likelihood of disengaging from Introspection and Self Enhancement  4 
academic studies (Robins & Beer, 2001). Interpersonal costs involve being perceived negatively 
and treated unpleasantly by others. For example, after a brief period of infatuation, peers come to 
regard inveterate self enhancers as conceited, defensive and hostile (Paulhus, 1998), and are 
generally prone to deride them, if not isolate them interpersonally (Schlenker & Leary, 1982). In 
addition, concerns about promoting or protecting a favorable public self image can prompt 
actions that lead to illness, injury, and death: Notoriously, people from temperate climes often 
sunbathe for hours to look and feel good among their peers, thereby raising their risk of 
sunstroke, sunburn, and skin cancer (Leary, Tchividjian, & Kraxberger, 1994). 
In view of these inauspicious correlates, it is perhaps salutary that self enhancement, 
although pervasive, is not inevitable: it varies naturally and can be strategically manipulated. For 
example, the topic of judgment moderates self enhancement: people self enhance less on traits 
that lack ambiguity (Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 1989) or that they believe they can 
modify (Dauenheimer, Stahlberg, Spreeman, & Sedikides, 2002). In addition, several 
interpersonal factors are also known to constrain self enhancement. These include the similarity 
of the comparison other to the self (Stapel & Schwinghammer, 2004), the concreteness of the 
comparison other (Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher, Yurak, & Vredenburg, 1995), concerns about 
preserving close relationships (Tice, Butler, Muraven, & Stillwell, 1995), and social pressures to 
be accountable (Sedikides, Herbst, Hardin, & Dardis, 2002). However, given the problems that 
self enhancement sometimes poses, it is worth exploring what other factors have the potential to 
curtail it. In this article, we investigate a possible intrapersonal factor: introspection. 
Varieties of Introspection 
The human ability to introspect has long fascinated philosophers. Descartes (see 
Cottingham, Stoothoff, & Murdoch, 1984) regarded reflexive thought as proof of an indubitable 
self. Introspection has also captivated the attention of psychologists, from the early structuralists 
(Titchener, 1912; Wundt, 1894) to modern day experimental social psychologists (Hirt & 
Markman, 1995; Hixon & Swann, 1993; Wilson, Dunn, Kraft, & Lisle, 1989). Importantly, 
introspection is considered a uniquely human capacity (Sedikides & Skowronski, 1997, 2000; Introspection and Self Enhancement  5 
Sedikides, Skowronski, & Dunbar, 2006) and its investigation is central to personality and social 
psychology (Bless & Forgas, 2000; Maio & Olson, 1998; Wilson & Dunn, 2004). 
Conceptual Distinctions 
Introspection is the process of looking inward, thinking “about [one’s] thoughts and 
feelings” (Wilson et al., 1993, p. 33), or about oneself as a whole. However, introspection is not 
a unitary construct. Indeed, it can be conceptualized in at least two distinct ways. 
One type of introspection constitutes what we term descriptive introspection. This 
denotes the act of contemplating what one’s personality is like. When introspecting descriptively, 
people ask themselves questions like “Do I have (or not have) traits X and Y?” or “To what 
extent do I have (or not have) traits X and Y?” People then conclude that they possess or lack 
particular traits to some degree or other. Another type of introspection constitutes what we term 
explanatory introspection. This denotes the act of contemplating why one does or does not think 
of oneself in a particular way. When introspecting explanatorily, people ask themselves 
questions like “Why might I have (or not have) traits X and Y?” or “What are the reasons for my 
having (or not having) traits X and Y?” People then generate reasons that explain why they either 
possess or lack particular traits to some degree or other. 
Descriptive and Explanatory Introspection: A Review of the Literature 
Descriptive and explanatory introspection, or key elements thereof, have already been 
operationalized as independent variables in past research. Consider two lines of inquiry. First, 
Tesser (1978) investigated the consequences of thinking about an attitude object for which a 
well developed knowledge base exists. Intensive thinking led to the formation of an 
evaluatively consistent belief set, which in turn polarized attitudinal judgments. That is, intensive 
thinking produced “more univalent, less ambivalent” attitudes (p. 295). Second, Hixon and 
Swann (1993: Experiment 3) had participants peruse particular dimensions of personality. In 
particular, undergraduates with low self esteem pondered the question “What kind of person are 
you in terms of sociability, likeability, and interestingness?” while weighing up the accuracy of 
two evaluations—one flattering and one critical—that graduate students ostensibly provided of Introspection and Self Enhancement  6 
them. Consistent with their pre existing negative self view, the undergraduates endorsed the 
critical evaluation over the flattering one. 
The two lines of inquiry have common elements. First, in terms of procedure, participants 
either reviewed a stored body of knowledge, or answered a “what” question. Both activities are 
clearly reminiscent of descriptive introspection. Second, in terms of outcome, participants either 
consolidated an attitude or confirmed a self view. Either way, a previously held belief was 
strengthened. The conjunction of these facts suggests that descriptive introspection is a source of 
psychological stability (Silvia & Gendolla, 2001). 
In other lines of research, examples of explanatory introspection are clearly discernible. 
Wilson and his colleagues have investigated the impact of this type of introspection on attitudes 
towards various objects (e.g., the self, political candidates, collegiate classes; Wilson, Dunn et 
al., 1989). Participants wrote down some reasons why they liked or disliked an object and 
thereafter expressed their attitudes toward that object. Reasons analysis perturbed attitudes, 
prompting either a shift in direction or an increase in variability (Wilson et al., 1993). This 
perturbation was attributed to the temporary accessibility of reasons that, although easily 
verbalized and subjectively plausible, are nonetheless unrepresentative of the full set of reasons 
and at odds with dispositional preferences. Similar experimental procedures, findings and 
explanations apply to a line of research on value change by Maio, Olson, and colleagues 
(Bernard, Maio, & Olson, 2003a; Maio & Olson, 1998; Maio, Olson, Allen, & Bernard, 2001). 
Both research programs suggest that explanatory introspection is an agent of psychological 
change. 
Explanatory introspection also features in research on explanatory bias. Participants, 
when instructed to explain why a particular hypothetical outcome might occur, overestimate the 
likelihood of its occurrence (Ross, Lepper, Strack, & Steinmetz, 1977). The bias is observed 
regardless of whether the to be explained outcome pertains to the self (Kunda & Sanitioso, 
1989), to another person (Anderson, 1982), or to an event like a political election (Caroll, 1978) 
or sporting competition (Markman & Hirt, 2002). As in the attitudes/values literature, Introspection and Self Enhancement  7 
information availability and accessibility have been invoked as underlying mechanisms. In 
particular, the goal of explaining some outcome prompts an information search that brings 
outcome consistent arguments to the forefront of the mind (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), where 
they influence, in an assimilative manner, the ensuing judgment (Kunda & Sanitioso, 1989). An 
alternative account of explanatory bias posits that the goal of outcome explanation prompts a 
frame of mind in which the explanation (or focal hypothesis; Koehler, 1991) is assumed to be 
true. Evidence is then reviewed from the perspective of that frame, and thus selectively 
accumulates in the direction of the focal hypothesis, leading its merits to be overestimated (Hirt 
& Markman, 1995). Regardless of the underlying mechanism, research on explanatory bias 
suggests that explanatory introspection has well defined directional effects. 
Finally, explanatory introspection features in debiasing research. In a typical task, 
participants are presented with an event and instructed to explain how it might give rise both to 
one outcome and to another (alternative or contrary) outcome. This task—variants of which are 
known as counterexplanation, consider the opposite, inoculation, or consider an alternative—
attenuates the magnitude of the explanatory bias (Anderson, 1982; Hirt & Markman, 1995; Hirt, 
Kardes, & Markman, 2004; Lord, Lepper, & Preston, 1984). This body of research suggests that 
explanatory introspection, when it involves a consideration of more than one point of view, 
exerts a moderating influence on psychological processes. 
Taking our cue from the above lines of research, we wondered whether explanatory 
introspection could curtail self enhancement. We accordingly devised an introspection 
manipulation that blended elements of a prototypical debiasing manipulation with elements of a 
typical reasons analysis manipulation. Specifically, we had participants generate reasons for why 
they might or might not have a set of important personality traits.
2 Two key features of our 
adaptation are worth noting. First, our participants focused on the self rather than on a 
hypothetical person, object, or event. Second, our participants focused on central (or core) facets 
of the self (Sedikides, 1993). Thus, with the self involved, our particular adaptation likely Introspection and Self Enhancement  8 
facilitated the emergence of motivational processes above and beyond conventional cognitive 
ones. Any account of underlying mechanisms would need to take this into consideration. 
Pretesting 
  First off, we ran a pretest in order to identify a set of nomothetic trait dimensions that 
participants would regard as central to their self concept. In this pretest—as in all subsequently 
reported experiments—participants were undergraduates from the University of North Carolina 
at Chapel Hill, fulfilling an introductory psychology course option.  
Central trait dimensions can be operationally defined as those that elicit extreme ratings 
when it comes to three pertinent properties: self descriptiveness (i.e., either highly self 
descriptive or not at all self descriptive), valence (i.e., either highly positive or highly negative), 
and importance (i.e., very important to have or very important not to have). Sixty five 
participants duly rated 24 trait adjectives—corresponding to the positive and negative poles of 12 
trait dimensions—in terms of all three properties (Table 1). Central trait dimensions were then 
selected for use, if two conditions were met. First, the positive pole of the dimension had to be 
rated among the four most self descriptive, most positive, and most important to have; second, 
the negative pole of the dimension had to be rated among the four least self descriptive, least 
positive (i.e., most negative), and least important to have. These selection criteria yielded three 
central trait dimensions: honest dishonest, kind unkind, and trustworthy untrustworthy. These 
trait dimensions were subsequently broken down into two contrasting categories of trait adjective 
for use in the experiments: central positive (honest, kind, trustworthy), and central negative 
(dishonest, unkind, untrustworthy). 
Experiment 1 
The objective of Experiment 1 was to test whether explanatory introspection curtails self 
enhancement. We instructed participants to analyze the reasons both for why they might and 
might not have a particular trait.
 Additionally, we asked some participants to introspect 
explanatorily about positive traits, others about negative traits. Participants in the control group 
engaged in a neutral task irrelevant to self. Our prediction was that, compared to control Introspection and Self Enhancement  9 
participants, explanatory introspection participants would self enhance less by giving both lower 
self ratings on positive traits and higher self ratings on negative traits. 
Method 
Participants and Experimental Design 
  Eighty eight participants were randomly assigned to a 2 (Cognitive Activity: Explanatory 
Introspection vs. Control) X 2 (Trait Valence: Positive vs. Negative) balanced factorial design. In 
this and all subsequent experiments, participants were tested individually and debriefed 
thoroughly. 
Procedure 
  Participants assigned to the two Explanatory Introspection cells were instructed to 
generate reasons for why they might or might not have each of three traits. In the Positive cell, 
the traits in question were honest, kind and trustworthy, and in the Negative cell, dishonest, 
unkind and untrustworthy. The instructions read as follows: 
“We are interested in the reasons why you might or might not have the trait ___Please 
take a few moments to think about why you might or might not have the trait ___.We 
want you to analyze very carefully the reasons you might or might not have the trait ___ 
because this will help you organize your thoughts for subsequent tasks.” 
Participants were encouraged one final time to analyze very carefully why they both might and 
might not have each trait, and were then asked to write the relevant reasons down, using a 
separate page for each trait. Participants assigned to the two Control cells instead listed as many 
uses as possible—again, positive or negative, depending on the cell— for three everyday objects 
(spoon, brick, and briefcase; cf. Sedikides, Campbell, Reeder, & Elliot, 1998), and again used a 
separate page for each item. Participants were told that all pages were theirs to keep if they so 
desired so as to encourage frank responding. However, all opted to leave the pages behind in the 
experimental booth. 
Next, all participants (including controls) rated the self descriptiveness of three traits 
(positive or negative, depending on the experimental condition). In particular, they responded to Introspection and Self Enhancement  10 
the question: “To what extent do you think you have the trait ___?” (1 = not at all, 15 = very 
much). Finally, to explore underlying mechanism, Explanatory Introspection participants (but not 
Controls) labeled each reason that they generated as either “confirming” or “disconfirming” the 
trait they had considered. 
Results 
Self-Evaluation 
The three trait self descriptiveness ratings were internally consistent (α = .95) and so 
averaged to form a composite index. We then entered this index to a two way factorial ANOVA 
(Cognitive Activity X Trait Valence). A significant main effect for Trait Valence emerged: 
Participants rated positive traits (M = 12.64) as more self descriptive than negative traits (M = 
3.36), F(1, 84) = 1402, p < .001, replicating a well established finding (Sedikides, 1993). 
More importantly, this main effect was qualified by a predicted interaction, F(1, 84) = 
9.67, p < .005. Explanatory introspection participants regarded positive traits (M = 12.20, SD = 
1.38) as significantly less self descriptive than controls did (M = 13.09, SD = .98), F(1, 42) = 
6.10, p < .02, and regarded negative traits (M = 3.68, SD = 1.35) as marginally more self 
descriptive than controls did (M = 3.03, SD = .85), F(1, 42) = 3.66, p < .06. That is, explanatory 
introspection participants, compared to controls, evaluated themselves less positively and 
(tendentially) more negatively. In sum, explanatory introspection curtailed self enhancement. 
Reasons Generated 
On the basis of past research, we expected that, during explanatory introspection, 
participants would engage in autobiographical searches, retrieving episodic or abstract 
information from long term memory. This was indeed the case. In this and subsequent 
experiments, the reasons that participants gave (a) were non overlapping, and (b) consisted 
almost uniquely of episodic memories or habitual behaviors, for example, “I [once] lied to 
parents about where I went at night” (confirming dishonest) and “I [typically] tell people actually 
what I think about them” (confirming honest). Introspection and Self Enhancement  11 
We also expected that the reasons participants generated would correspond intelligibly to 
their self descriptiveness ratings. To begin with, we summed the total number of reasons that 
each participant labeled as confirming a trait, and then divided this by the total number of 
reasons they generated for that trait. We derived such a ratio separately for each trait, and then 
created a composite confirmation index by averaging all three ratios (α = .75). A one way 
ANOVA incorporating this index showed that participants generated a significantly higher 
proportion of confirming reasons when they considered positive traits (M = .73) than when they 
considering negative ones (M = .38), F(1, 42) = 35.57, p < .001. Interpreted somewhat 
differently, participants confirmed their positive but disconfirmed their negative traits, 
replicating past research (Dunning et al., 1989; Sedikides, 1993). 
More importantly, we investigated whether the confirmation index correlated 
significantly with participants’ self descriptiveness scores. It did, r(42) = .72, p < .001. This 
result suggests that explanatory introspection participants based their self descriptiveness ratings 
largely on the reasons they generated. Moreover, this account is in keeping with previous 
research showing that the generation of supportive thoughts increases the endorsement of 
personality characteristics (Davies, 2003). However, alternative accounts—for example, that 
reasons were based on self descriptions—cannot be definitively ruled out. (We investigate the 
matter further in Experiment 3.) Note that the correlations between the confirmation index and 
self descriptiveness scores for participants considering positive traits (r[20] = .27, p < .23) and 
negative traits (r[20] = .40, p < .07) did not differ significantly from one another, z = .45, p < .65. 
Summary 
Relative to Controls, participants who explanatorily introspected showed an attenuated 
tendency to self enhance. In particular, they regarded positive traits as significantly less self 
descriptive, and negative traits as marginally more self descriptive. Regardless of trait valence, 
self descriptiveness scores correlated with confirmatory reasons generated via explanatory 
introspection, suggesting that self judgments varied as a function of the accessibility of 
autobiographical instances. Introspection and Self Enhancement  12 
Discussion 
What are the psychological mechanisms by which explanatory introspection curtails self 
evaluation? Explanatory introspection both reduced the positivity of self views on positive 
dimensions and tended to increase the negativity of self views on negative dimensions. Any 
comprehensive account must therefore explain why self enhancement was attenuated in both 
cases.  
The first point to note is that, given the ubiquity and common pre eminence of the self 
enhancement motive (Baumeister, 1998; Sedikides & Gregg, 2003), participants’ levels of self 
regard were likely approaching their upper limit. This is because, to the extent that people can 
self enhance, they generally will: the balloon of self regard will rise as far as the ballast of 
rational and normative constraints permits (Sedikides & Strube, 1997). At the start of the 
experimental session, our participants, already fairly high achieving members of a Western 
culture, would not have been under any special pressure to self derogate. Their levels of self 
regard would likely have been closer to their maximum than their minimum. Thus, their self 
regard would have had more room for maneuver in a downward direction than in an upward one, 
regardless of whether they explanatorily introspected about positive traits or about negative ones. 
Hence, any factor undermining self regard would have observably reduced it more than any 
intrinsically comparable factor promoting self regard would have observably increased it. 
The second point to note is that, generally speaking, negative factors exert a greater 
impact than positive ones (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001). To take one of 
numberless examples, the prospect of losing a substantial sum of money strikes most people as 
more aversive than the prospect of gaining that sum strikes them as attractive (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1981). Now, explanatory introspection participants were instructed to consider, not 
only why they might possess, but also why they might not possess, particular traits. Thus, when 
those traits were positive, participants considered both why they might possess them (an 
attractive reflection) and why they might not (an aversive reflection); and when those traits were 
negative, participants considered both why they might possess them (an aversive reflection) and Introspection and Self Enhancement  13 
why they might not (an attractive reflection). Given the generally greater power of negative 
factors, it would hardly be surprising if participants’ aversive reflections exerted greater 
psychological impact than the attractive reflections. If they did—and if, as seemed to have been 
the case, their self regard varied as a function of the reasons they generated—then the net result 
would have been a reduction in self enhancement. 
The combination of both dynamics plausibly accounts in general for why explanatory 
introspection curtails self enhancement, regardless of whether positive or negative traits are 
considered. Of course, this is only a distal outline; the proximal details still require filling in. The 
effects of explanatory introspection are likely proximally mediated by induced variations in the 
accessibility of self knowledge (Davies, 2003; Fazio, Effrein, & Falender, 1981; Schwarz et al., 
1991). Explanatorily introspecting participants, when attempting to answer self generated 
questions about whether they possess or lack personality traits, will engage in retrospective 
mental simulations (Sanna, 2000) and autobiographical memory searches (Kihlstrom, Beer, & 
Klein, 2003). Such simulations and searches will prompt consideration of a relatively broad set 
of plausible alternatives. Participants will bring to mind both instances in which they behaved in 
a trait confirming manner and instances in which they behaved in trait disconfirming manner. 
The relative accessibility of these instances, accompanied by a state of heightened self 
uncertainty (Petty, Brinol, & Tormala, 2002), will then trigger corresponding self judgments 
(i.e., trait self descriptiveness ratings). In terms of the two dynamics discussed above, 
negatively toned simulations and searches are liable to be rendered more accessible, or to be 
weighted more heavily, than positively toned ones; and, given the normative positivity of self 
regard, such negatively toned simulations will have greater scope for impact. 
Experiment 2 
One purpose of Experiment 2 was simply to replicate Experiment 1. We therefore 
included experimental and control conditions permitting the effects of explanatory introspection 
to be tested, both when positive and negative traits were considered. But Experiment 2 had an 
additional purpose: to pin down the precise preconditions for curtailing self enhancement Introspection and Self Enhancement  14 
through explanatory introspection. This necessitated some methodological additions and 
theoretical extensions. 
First, we wondered whether the active ingredient of our manipulation might be the more 
general act of asking explanatory questions about personality traits (or anything else) rather than 
the more specific act of asking explanatory questions about one’s own personality traits. Do 
inquiries have to be self directed in order for self enhancement to be curtailed, or will other 
directed inquiries suffice? Because only self directed inquiries constitute introspection, this 
question needed to be addressed. To address it, we directly manipulated the target of scrutiny 
(Target Type). In particular, we had half the participants consider their own personality traits 
(Self), and the other half an acquaintance’s personality traits (Other). We predicted that self 
enhancement would be curtailed only in the Self condition. Note that this distinction between 
self directed and other directed inquiry parallels one drawn by previous researchers (Klein & 
Loftus, 1988; Sedikides & Green, 2000), who argued that different cognitive processes are at 
work when individuals process self related versus other related information: elaboration in the 
first case (i.e., considering a new instance in relation to prior self knowledge), organization in the 
second (i.e., considering a new instance in relation to other instances). 
Second, we further explored the hypothesis that temporary self knowledge accessibility 
mediates the impact of explanatory introspection on self enhancement. As before, we asked all 
participants in the Explanatory Introspection condition to generate reasons why they might have 
or not have a set of traits. This time, however, we instructed only half of them to list those 
reasons in written form, and instructed the other half merely to entertain those reasons in mental 
form. We labeled this variable Activity Type (Written vs. Mental). We suspected that the 
requirement to write reasons down would be a critical factor in success of the manipulation. For 
one thing, the act of writing something down is liable to concretize and stabilize thoughts that 
would otherwise remain hypothetical and fleeting; this, in turn, is liable to increase durably the 
accessibility of trait related thoughts and their derivative associations (cf. Pennebaker, 2003). For 
another thing, the act of writing something down is liable to engender consistency motivation by Introspection and Self Enhancement  15 
committing participants to the content of statements willingly expressed (Festinger & Carlsmith, 
1959) or increasing a sense of accountability (Tetlock, Skitka, & Boettger, 1989); this, in turn, is 
liable to increase durably the weight ascribed to the underlying thoughts and associations. Hence, 
we predicted that the effects of explanatory introspection would be present in the Written 
condition but not in the Mental condition. 
Third, past research suggests that, whereas explanatory introspection instigates a 
relatively impartial search of relevant autobiographical details (i.e., one that promotes 
psychological change), descriptive introspection instigates a relatively biased search (i.e., one 
that preserves psychological consistency; Tesser, 1978; Hixon & Swann, 1983). Hence, only 
explanatory introspection should curtail self enhancement: descriptive introspection should 
merely maintain it. We tested this hypothesis by manipulating Inquiry Type (Explanatory vs. 
Descriptive). In particular, half of the participants considered the reasons why they (or someone 
else) did or did not possess particular traits (Explanatory), whereas the other half merely 
considered the extent to which they (or someone else) did or did not possess particular traits 
(Descriptive). (Note: In the Mental condition, Descriptive participants thought about the extent of 
trait possession, whereas in the Written condition, they committed those thoughts to paper.) We 
predicted that only explanatory participants (inquiring about self) would show moderation of 
self regard on positive traits and extremification of self regard on negative traits.  
Finally, we modified our key manipulation slightly to reinforce its construct validity. In 
Experiment 1, both explanatory and control participants were free to take as much time as they 
needed to complete the task at hand. This methodological imperfection left the door open for 
possible confounds. For example, explanatory participants may have taken longer than control 
participants. If so, then the findings of Experiment 1 may simply have been due to more 
protracted cognitive activity. Hence, we standardized the task completion time to eliminate such 
temporal confounds. Specifically, all participants were allotted three minutes per trait.  
  In summary, Experiment 2 tested the boundary conditions of the self enhancement 
curtailment effect observed in Experiment 1. We predicted that this effect would be observed Introspection and Self Enhancement  16 
only (or primarily) when participants (a) engaged in self directed inquiries (as opposed to other 
directed ones), (b) listed relevant considerations in writing (as opposed to merely mentally 
entertaining them), and (c) engaged in explanatory (as opposed to descriptive) introspection. 
Method 
Participants and Experimental Design 
  One hundred and sixty participants were randomly assigned to one of 16 experimental 
conditions yielded by a 2 (Target Type: Self vs. Other) X 2 (Activity Type: Written vs. Mental) 
X 2 (Cognitive Activity: Explanatory vs. Descriptive) X 2 (Trait Valence: Positive vs. Negative) 
balanced factorial design. 
A further 20 participants were randomly assigned to one of two control conditions (Trait 
Valence: Positive vs. Negative) identical to those in Experiment 1. The purpose of these control 
conditions was to test the replicability of Experiment 1, and to permit an additional test of the 
hypotheses of Experiment 2. 
Procedure 
  Participants in the Explanatory condition were instructed to generate reasons (in written 
or mental form) for why someone (either they or another person) might or might not have three 
traits (either positive or negative). Instructions and traits dovetailed those of Experiment 1. 
Participants in the Descriptive condition were instructed to describe the extent to which someone 
might or might not have each trait. 
  Participants in the Self condition directed their trait related inquires towards themselves, 
whereas those in the Other condition directed their trait related inquiries towards an 
acquaintance. Before beginning, the latter wrote down the name of an acquaintance, and then 
stated (a) how many times they had interacted with him or her, (b) how well they knew him or 
her, and (c) how positive or negative their impression of him or her was. On average, participants 
reported that they had interacted with the acquaintance several times (M = 5.36 times) but they 
did not (yet) know him or her very well (M = 3.69, on a 9 point scale ranging from 1 = not well Introspection and Self Enhancement  17 
at all to 9 = very well), although they had nonetheless formed a mildly positive impression of 
him or her (M = 6.24, on a 9 point scale ranging from 1 = very negative to 9 = very positive). 
  Participants in the Written condition were instructed to list, on a separate sheet for each 
trait, the reasons (or thoughts) they had generated. Participants in the Mental condition were 
instructed that they need not to write anything down: it would suffice to generate the relevant 
reasons (or thoughts) in their head. 
After being asked to generate reasons why (or thoughts about the extent to which) they 
might and might not possess each trait, all experimental participants were informed that they 
could generate as many or as few reasons (or thoughts) as they wished, but that they must do so 
within three minutes. Participants in the Control condition, working to the same deadline, were 
instructed to list as many uses as possible for a spoon, brick, and briefcase. All but 11 
participants opted to leave the reasons pages behind in the experimental booth. 
The final manipulated factor, Trait Valence, applied to both experimental and control 
participants. In different conditions, the former considered either three positive or three negative 
traits, and the latter either positive or negative uses for three objects. Finally, all participants 
completed self descriptiveness trait ratings, as they had in Experiment 1. 
Results and Discussion 
Self-Evaluation 
Being internally consistent (α = .94), the three trait self descriptiveness ratings were 
again averaged to form a composite index. We then entered this index into a four way factorial 
ANOVA (Target Type X Cognitive Activity X Trait Valence X Activity Type). Replicating 
Experiment 1, a significant main effect for Trait Valence emerged, with participants endorsing 
positive traits (M = 12.21) more strongly than negative traits (M = 3.92), F(1, 144) = 1164, p < 
.001.  
  Importantly, this main effect was qualified by a three way interaction between Target 
Type, Cognitive Activity, and Trait Valence, F(1, 144) = 3.96, p < .05. To clarify its meaning, 
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each level of Target Type (Other vs. Self). For Other, the interaction was not significant, F(1,72) 
< 1; for Self, it was, F(1, 72) = 4.11, p < .05. Specifically, Explanatory participants in the self 
condition endorsed positive traits marginally less strongly than Descriptive participants (Ms = 
11.68 vs. 12.63), F(1, 36) = 3.44, p < .07; they also endorsed negative traits nonsignificantly 
more strongly (Ms = 4.62 vs. 3.92), F(1, 36) = 1.22, p < .28. This suggests that, averaging across 
Activity Type, explanatory introspection curtailed self enhancement overall (relative to 
descriptive introspection). 
However, the above three way interaction was in turn qualified by Activity Type, to yield 
the predicted four way interaction, F(1, 144) = 4.67, p < .04 (Table 2). We decomposed it by 
examining the three way Cognitive Activity X Trait Valence X Activity Type interaction 
separately for each level of Target Type (Other vs. Self). For Other participants, the three way 
interaction was not significant, F(1, 72) < 1, p < .99; for Self participants, it was, F(1, 72) = 6.13, 
p < .02. To further clarify our findings, we then decomposed this significant three way 
interaction for Self participants in two ways.  
First, we examined the two way Cognitive Activity X Trait Valence interaction for each 
level of Activity Type (Mental vs. Written). For Mental participants, the interaction was not 
significant, F(1, 36) < 1; for Written participants, it was, F(1, 36) = 8.12, p < .02. In terms of 
simple effects, Explanatory participants (who wrote down their inquiries) endorsed positive traits 
significantly less strongly than Descriptive participants (who wrote down their thoughts), F(1, 
18) = 6.92, p < .02; they also endorsed negative traits marginally more strongly, F(1, 18) = 2.14, 
p < .14. As predicted, self enhancement curtailment occurred only when self directed 
explanatory inquiries took written form. 
Second, we examined the two way Activity Type X Trait Valence interaction for each 
level of Cognitive Activity (Descriptive vs. Explanatory). For Descriptive participants, the 
interaction was not significant, F(1, 36) < 1; for Explanatory participants, it was, F(1, 36) = 
10.92, p < .002. In terms of simple effects, Written participants (who wrote down why they did 
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merely contemplated why they did or did not possess traits), F(1, 18) = 4.78 , p < .05; they also 
endorsed negative traits more strongly, F(1, 18) = 6.14, p < .05. As predicted, self enhancement 
curtailment occurred only when self directed writings documented reasons for possessing or 
lacking traits. 
  In summary, we confirmed all hypotheses regarding the boundary conditions of the 
effects observed in Experiment 1. Self enhancement was curtailed when participants (a) 
considered their own traits rather than those of another person, (b) wrote down what they 
considered rather than merely keeping it in mind, and (c) inquired into why those traits were held 
as opposed to the extent to which they were held. 
  Supplementary analyses. With a view to replicating the results of Experiment 1 and more 
robustly testing our hypotheses, we conducted additional planned comparisons between 
experimental and control participants. In particular, we examined three types of participants: (a) 
those who explanatorily introspected about their own personality traits in written form 
(Self/Written/Explanatory, or SWC); (b) those who reflected upon the extent of their own 
personality traits in written form (Self/Written/Descriptive, or SWD); and (c) those who 
considered possible uses for three everyday objects in written form (Control, or CON). We 
principally sought to investigate whether SWC participants self enhanced less than CON 
participants, replicating the results of Experiment 1. However, we additionally sought to 
investigate whether (a) the SWD and CON participants self enhanced similarly with one another, 
but (b) together self enhanced more than SWC participants. This would establish the essential 
comparability of the Descriptive Introspection manipulation (newly featured in Experiment 2) 
and the Control manipulation (also featured in Experiment 1). Any effects of explanatory 
introspection would therefore be tested relative to a consistent baseline in Experiments 1 and 2. 
  We duly regressed the composite self descriptiveness index onto three predictors: a main 
effect contrast for Trait Valence (Positive = 1, Negative =  1); two main effects contrasts to test 
predictions (a) and (b) above respectively [(a) SWC = 0, SWD = +1, CON =  1; (b) SWC = 1, 
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for the Trait Valence main effect by the contrast values for each of the Cognitive Activity main 
effects. All relevant means and standard deviations are presented in Table 3. 
First, we compared SWC participants to SWD and CON participants combined in terms 
of their Trait Valence differentials. The critical interaction contrast was significant, B =  .21, 
t(54) =  3.67, p < .001. Next, we conducted both main effect contrasts for Positive and Negative 
traits separately. As predicted, the difference between SWD and CON participants was not 
significant for Positive traits, B = .06, t(27) = .37, p < .75, or for Negative traits, B = .08, t(27) = 
.43, p < .65. These results attest to the comparability of the Descriptive and Control introspection 
conditions. Also as predicted, the difference between SWC participants, and the SWD and CON 
participants combined, was significant for both Positive traits, B =  .51, t(27) =  3.11, p < .01, 
and Negative Traits, B = .39, t(27) = 2.21, p < .05. Self enhancement was significantly curtailed 
among SWC participants relative to SWD and CON participants. 
Reasons 
We will start by providing examples of reasons that participants listed in the Cognitive 
Activity (Explanatory vs. Descriptive) X 2 (Trait Valence: Positive vs. Negative) conditions, 
when the target type was the self and the activity type was written. These examples are: “I am 
always straightforward and tell a person how it is” (confirming honest, Explanatory Positive 
condition); “Sometimes I tell people things that others don’t want me to tell them” (confirming 
untrustworthy, Explanatory Negative condition); “People always tell me how nice I am” 
(confirming kind, Descriptive Positive condition); and “It is too tiring to be nice all the time” 
(confirming unkind, Descriptive Negative condition). 
In Experiment 1, Explanatory participants rated (following the manipulation) the degree 
to which each trait was self descriptive, and then labeled the reasons they had listed as either 
confirming or disconfirming each trait. However, this practice was vulnerable to confounds 
involving self perception (Bem, 1972) or dissonance (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959). That is, 
participants’ reasons labeling decisions may have been driven, at least in part, by a need to 
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rated themselves as honest may subsequently have come to perceive the reasons they listed as 
confirming their honesty, especially if they valued being honest, or their reasons admitted of 
interpretation. 
To partly address this possibility, we asked two independent coders, unaware of the 
hypotheses under study, to label each reason that Explanatory participants listed as either 
confirming or disconfirming each relevant trait (for either Self or Other). The coders agreed 96% 
of the time and resolved disagreements though discussion. We proceeded by computing a 
confirmation index for each participant (α = .81) as in Experiment 1. Next, we entered this index 
into a Target Type X Trait Valence ANOVA. Replicating Experiment 1, participants were more 
likely to generate reasons confirming positive traits than reasons confirming negative traits (Ms = 
.86 vs. .27), F(1, 25) = 36.90, p < .001.
3 However, this effect was qualified by an interaction, 
F(1, 25) = 5.75, p < .02. Participants showed a weak explanatory tendency to confirm positive 
traits less for Self (M = .80) than for Other (M = .92), F(1, 12) = 1.64, p < .22, combined with a 
marginal tendency confirm negative traits more for Self (M = .46) than for Other (M = .15), F(1, 
13) = 4.24, p < .06. In our view, this makes it less likely that consistency motivation led 
participants to revise their reason labels in light of their self descriptiveness ratings. If they had, 
then the tendency to confirm positive and disconfirm negative traits should have been more 
pronounced in the more personally consequential Self condition than in the less personally 
consequential Other condition. 
As in Experiment 1, we examined the relation between participants’ self descriptiveness 
ratings and the confirmation index derived from participants’ own reason labelings. The 
correlation was again significant, r(27) = .85, p < .001, suggesting that participants partially 
based their self descriptiveness ratings on the reasons that they generated, although the reverse 
causal path cannot be ruled out. As before, no significant difference emerged in participants’ 
propensity to form online self evaluations (z = .10, p < .92) after explanatorily introspecting 
about positive traits, r(12) = .63, p < .02, and after explanatorily introspecting about negative 
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Summary 
Experiment 2 achieved several substantive objectives. First, it replicated the self 
enhancement curtailment effect observed in Experiment 1. Second, it ruled out a potential rival 
explanation for the effect, namely, that it was merely due to more protracted thinking. Third, 
Experiment 2 extended Experiment 1 by identifying several key boundary conditions of the self 
enhancement curtailment effect. It showed that explanatory cognition is essential (descriptive 
cognition does not suffice); it showed that self directed cognition is essential (other directed 
cognition does not suffice); and it showed that that written expression is essential (abstract 
contemplation does not suffice). Finally, Experiment 2 provided further correlations between 
listed reasons and self ratings suggesting that the changes in the acute accessibility of self 
knowledge lie at the heart of the self enhancement curtailment effect. 
Experiment 3 
In Experiment 3, we sought to test whether explanatory introspection curtails self 
enhancement by reducing self certainty (Petty et al., 2002). The experiment followed a five step 
procedure. First, participants rated themselves on three positive traits. (For simplicity, we 
omitted negative traits). We labeled these ratings pre introspection self descriptiveness, or 
SDPRE. Second, we introduced the manipulation: participants were randomly assigned to 
introspect explanatorily, to introspect descriptively, or to perform a control task. Third, 
participants rated how certain they were that they possessed the three positive traits; that is, they 
indicated how sure they were about SDPRE. We labeled these ratings pre introspection self 
description certainty, or CERTPRE. Fourth, participants re rated themselves on the same three 
traits. We labeled these ratings post introspection self descriptiveness, or SDPOST. (This 
dependent measure corresponds to the main dependent measure of Experiments 1 and 2.) Fifth, 
participants re rated how certain they were that they possessed the three positive traits; that is, 
they indicated afresh how sure they were about SDPOST. We labeled these ratings post 
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What pattern of results would suggest that a reduction in self certainty was responsible 
for the impact of explanatory introspection on self enhancement? Just this: After explanatorily 
introspecting, participants should be relatively less certain about their original self views. This 
decrease in certainty should in turn shape their post manipulation self views, now revised 
downwards. However, after re expressing their revised self views, participants’ self certainty 
should rebound. 
In more technical terms, we expected that Explanatory participants (relative to both 
Descriptive and Control participants) would, following the manipulation, have lower CERTPRE 
ratings, because they would now be less certain of their original self views. Such participants 
would also have lower SDPOST ratings, controlling for SDPRE ratings, because explanatory 
introspection would have curtailed their proclivity to self enhance. Most importantly, variations 
in self certainty would also mediate the effects of the manipulation on self views; that is, 
CERTPRE ratings would mediate the effects of the manipulation on SDPOST. However, following 
the expression of SDPOST, self certainty would be restored: no differences between conditions in 
CERTPOST would be observed. 
Method 
Participants, Experimental Design, and Procedure 
  Fifty one participants were assigned randomly to one of three conditions: explanatory 
introspection (Explanatory), descriptive introspection (Descriptive), and object use generation 
(Control). Thus, the experiment featured a one way balanced between subjects design. 
Procedures were largely identical to those of Experiment 2 (in the Self and Written conditions). 
As in Experiment 1, all participants left the entire booklet behind. 
  Participants completed SDPRE ratings for three traits: honest, kind, and trustworthy. The 
manipulation followed. Finally, all participants completed CERTPRE ratings, SDPOST ratings, and 
CERTPOST ratings. 
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  SDPRE ratings. Participants responded to two items for each trait. The first read “Please 
rate yourself, relative to other college students your own age, on the trait ___” (1 = lower 5%, 10 
= upper 5%). The second read, “Please rate yourself, relative to other people in general, on the 
trait ___” (1 = lower 5%, 10 = upper 5%). We averaged both items for each trait to create three 
indices, (α = .91, .85, and .95, for honest, kind, and trustworthy, respectively). Next, we averaged 
these indices to create a final composite index, SDPRE (α = .85). Higher scores indicate higher 
pre manipulation levels of trait self descriptiveness. 
  CERTPRE. Participants responded to three items for each trait. The first read, “How 
certain are you of the accuracy of the ratings you made a few moments ago in reference to the 
trait ___?” (1 = not at all certain, 15 = very certain). The second read, “How confident are you in 
the accuracy of the ratings you made a few moments ago in reference to the trait ___?” (1 = not 
at all confident, 15 = very confident). The third read, “How sure are you that the ratings you 
made a few moments ago about the trait ___ reflect your true level of the trait ___?” (1 = not at 
all sure, 15 = very sure). We averaged the three items for each trait to create three indices (α = 
.94, .96, and .95, for honest, kind, and trustworthy, respectively). Next, we averaged these 
indices to create a final composite index, CERTPRE (α = .80). Higher scores indicate greater 
certainty about pre manipulation levels of trait self descriptiveness. 
  SDPOST. Participants responded to three items for each trait. The wording was varied 
slightly in order to discourage reflexive repetition of previous responses. The first item read, 
“How descriptive of you is the trait ___?” (1 = not at all descriptive, 15 = very descriptive). The 
second read, “To what extent do you think you have the trait ___?” (1 = not at all, 15 = very 
much). The third read, “How well does the trait ___ describe you?” (1 = not well at all, 15 = very 
well). We averaged the three items for each trait to create three indices (α = .93, .89, and .97, for 
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composite index, SDPOST  (α = .77). Higher scores indicate higher levels of post manipulation 
trait self descriptiveness.  
  CERTPOST. These items were identical to those used for CERTPRE, with one minor 
modification. Each item referred to certainty about the accuracy of “…the ratings you JUST 
made in reference to the trait ___.” We averaged the three items for each trait to create three 
indices (α = .97, .98, and .97, for honest, kind, and trustworthy, respectively). Next, we averaged 
these indices to create a final composite index, CERTPOST (α = .83). Higher scores indicate 
greater certainty about post manipulation levels of trait self descriptiveness. 
Results and Discussion 
Self-Evaluation 
  All means and standard deviations for the self evaluation results are presented in Table 4. 
Did explanatory introspection reduce self-description certainty? We subjected CERTPRE 
ratings to a one way ANOVA. The main effect was significant, F(2, 48) = 3.14, p < .05: the 
pattern suggested that Explanatory participants (M = 12.03) were less certain about their traits 
than both Descriptive participants (M = 13.03) and Control (M = 13.49) participants. We used 
planned comparisons to pin down the locus of the effect. Specifically, after standardizing 
certainty ratings, we devised linear contrasts that (a) compared Explanatory participants to 
Descriptive and Control participants combined, and (b) compared Descriptive participants to 
Control participants. We simultaneously entered these orthogonal contrasts as predictors of the 
standardized certainty ratings. As predicted, Explanatory participants were less self certain than 
Descriptive and Control participants combined, B =  .32, t(48) =  2.39, p < .03, but Descriptive 
and Control participants did not differ in their self certainty, B =  .10, t(48) =  .77, p < .45. Thus, 
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Did explanatory introspection curtail self-enhancement (after controlling for pre-
introspection self-descriptiveness)? We subjected SDPOST ratings to a one way ANCOVA, with 
SDPRE ratings serving as a covariate. The main effect for the manipulation was again significant, 
F(2, 47) = 3.83, p < .05: the pattern suggested that Explanatory participants (M = 12.31) regarded 
the positive traits as less self descriptive than both Descriptive participants (M = 13.14) and 
Control participants (M = 13.62). Unsurprisingly, the effect of SDPRE ratings on SDPOST ratings 
was also significant, F(1, 47) = 7.70, p < .01. 
  Next, we devised linear contrasts analogous to (a) and (b) described above. We 
simultaneously entered both contrasts, together with SDPRE ratings, as predictors of SDPOST, after 
again standardizing both sets of ratings. Descriptive and Control participants did not differ in 
terms of their SDPOST ratings, B =  .16, t(47) =  1.29, p < .25. However, Explanatory participants 
regarded the positive traits as less self descriptive than did Descriptive and Control participants 
combined, B =  .31, t(47) =  2.44, p < .02. Thus, even after controlling for SDPRE ratings, 
explanatory introspection curtailed self enhancement, replicating both previous experiments. 
Did self-description certainty statistically mediate the impact of explanatory 
introspection on self-descriptiveness? To determine whether CERTPRE mediated the impact of 
explanatory introspection (characterized in terms of the two linear contrasts—[a] and [b] above) 
on SDPOST, we adopted Baron and Kenny’s (1986) analytic strategy. We had already satisfied one 
requirement—that the independent variable should significantly predict the dependent variable. 
Specifically, we had found that explanatory introspection led to relatively lower SDPOST ratings 
(adjusted for SDPRE ratings). We had also already satisfied another requirement—that the 
independent variable should significantly predict the proposed mediator. Specifically, we had 
found that explanatory introspection led to relatively lower CERTPRE ratings. We now sought to 
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predict the dependent variable, adjusted SDPOST ratings, controlling for the independent variable, 
explanatory introspection and (b) that, in the same analysis, the predictiveness of the independent 
variable is reduced significantly. We succeeded. Specifically, when adjusted SDPOST ratings were 
regressed on CERTPRE ratings, and on the two linear contrasts (a) and (b), the effect of CERTPRE 
ratings persisted, B = .68, t(46) = 7.39, p < .001, but the key linear contrast (a), previously 
significant, became nonsignificant, B =  .11, t(46) =  1.23, p < .25. Importantly, a significant 
indirect effect of that contrast on SDPOST ratings via CERTPRE emerged, z = 2.05, p < .05. In 
summary, the impact of explanatory introspection on post introspection self descriptiveness 
ratings was mediated by certainty about pre introspection self descriptiveness ratings. 
  Was certainty restored following post-introspection self-descriptiveness ratings? We 
subjected CERTPOST ratings to a one way ANOVA. Contrary to what was found for CERTPRE 
ratings, this main effect was not significant, F(2, 48) = 1.05, p < .40. Explanatory participants (M 
= 12.91) were nearly as certain about their post introspection self descriptiveness ratings as were 
Descriptive participants (M = 13.37) and Control participants (M = 13.70). For completeness, we 
ran the same planned contrasts as before, (a) and (b). Unsurprisingly, neither attained 
significance: (a) B =  .19, t(48) =  1.31, p < .20; (b) B =  .09, t(48) =  .61, p < .60.  
Reasons 
Dovetailing the results of Experiments 1 and 2 (for positive traits), explanatory 
participants generated reasons that they labeled as confirming their self descriptiveness ratings 
(77%). However, the design of Experiment 3, unlike that of previous experiments, permitted the 
disambiguation of two competing causal alternatives: Did Explanatory participants use reasons 
as a basis for (generating) their self descriptions? Or did they use their self descriptions as a 
basis for (labeling) their reasons? Support for the first alternative would be signaled by (a) a 
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significant positive correlation between the confirmation index and SDPRE ratings. Support for 
the second alternative would be signaled by the reverse pattern. 
Like before, we computed a confirmation index (α = .71) and correlated it with SDPOST 
ratings. The correlation was significant, r(15) = .77, p < .001. However, the corresponding 
correlation with SDPRE ratings was not, r(15) = .37, p < .14. Moreover, the difference between 
the two correlations was marginal, z = 1.66, p < .10. Thus, a pattern emerged consistent with the 
first alternative (and with our favored interpretation of relevant findings of Experiments 1 and 2). 
Explanatory participants based their self descriptiveness ratings on the products of their 
introspections, and did not label their reasons in light of their newly revised self views. 
Summary 
Experiment 3 established that explanatory introspection curtails self enhancement by 
decreasing self certainty. Three lines of evidence supported this assertion. First, explanatory 
introspection decreased participants’ certainty about their self views. Second, this decrease in 
self certainty fully mediated self enhancement curtailment. Third, after re expressing self views, 
participants recovered their former levels of self certainty. 
General Discussion 
  We investigated introspection as a means of curtailing people’s natural tendency towards 
self enhancement. We began by differentiating between two types of introspection: explanatory 
and descriptive. People engage in descriptive introspection when they contemplate or describe 
the extent to which they do or do not possess particular traits: in effect, they consider what kind 
of person they are. In contrast, people engage in explanatory introspection when they 
contemplate why they might or might not be a particular kind of person; in effect, they consider 
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  Next, taking our cue from prior research on reasons analysis (Wilson et al., 1989) and 
debiasing (Lord et al., 1984), we wondered whether explanatory introspection, as opposed to its 
descriptive cousin, would curtail self enhancement. Assuming it did so, we also wondered what 
the underlying mechanisms might be. We postulated that participants who explanatorily 
introspect conduct an autobiographical memory search for behavioral instances that support or 
refute the possession of trait (i.e., “reasons”). Retrieved instances then alter the accessibility of 
some items of self knowledge. Because self views are based in part on accessible self 
knowledge (Fazio et al., 1981), they consequently undergo at least temporary modification (cf. 
Wilson et al., 1989). Moreover, given that introspected traits are themselves either positive (e.g., 
kind) or negative (e.g., selfish), some reasons generated will be relatively congenial (supporting 
positive traits or refuting negative ones), whereas others will be relatively uncongenial 
(supporting negative traits or refuting positive ones). Although the former should prevail 
numerically—yet another example of self enhancement—the latter should nonetheless carry 
more weight (cf. Baumeister et al., 2001). Hence, self views should become more moderate, with 
positive traits being endorsed less strongly, and negative traits more strongly. In addition, 
explanatory introspection should leave an experiential mark: a heightened state of uncertainty 
about self views. Indeed, we postulated that this increase in self uncertainty would mediate the 
moderating effects of explanatory introspection on self enhancement. 
  To test our hypotheses, we conducted three experiments. In all three, participants 
considered a set of central traits in one way or another, and then indicated the extent to which 
those traits characterized them. Experiment 1 established that explanatory introspection curtails 
self enhancement. Participants who asked themselves why they did or did not possess traits were 
less likely to endorse positive traits, and (marginally) more likely to endorse negative traits. 
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generated, implicating a role for alterations in self knowledge accessibility. Experiment 2 
replicated, clarified, and extended the findings of Experiment 1. For self enhancement to be 
curtailed, participants’ trait related inquiries had to be explanatory (not descriptive), self directed 
(not other directed), and transcribed (not just contemplated). Finally, Experiment 3 provided 
evidence that reductions in self certainty mediate the impact of explanatory introspection on self 
enhancement. It also provided evidence that participants more probably based their self 
descriptions on the reasons that they generated than retrospectively classified the reasons they 
generated in light of their self descriptions.  
One general observation is worth making with respect to our findings. First, although 
explanatory introspection curtailed self enhancement significantly, the magnitude of its impact 
was modest. In particular, explanatory introspection participants still rated positive traits as more 
self descriptive than negative traits in an absolute sense; for example, on a 15 point scale, the 
respective Ms were 12.20 vs. 3.68 (Experiment 1) and  10.80 vs. 5.79 (Experiment 2, Written 
Activity Type). Yet this is hardly surprising, for two reasons. First, the propensity to self 
enhance, being so ingrained, is difficult to dislodge completely (Sedikides & Gregg, 2003). 
Second, the fact that people possess a rich fund of knowledge about self (Higgins, 1996) is liable 
to make self views relatively resistant to explanatory inquiry. It has been found, for instance, 
both in classic research on reasons analysis (Wilson, Kraft, & Dunn, 1989), as well as in more 
recent research on value change (Bernard, Maio, & Olson, 2003b), that the perturbing effects of 
explanatory introspection fade when people’s attitudes or values, the intended targets of change, 
are cognitively well supported. Moreover, central traits, being valued parts of one’s identity, are 
liable to be particularly well cognitively supported (Markus, 1977; Sedikides, 1995). 
Nevertheless, we consistently found that explanatory introspection curtailed self enhancement 
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elicits particularly elaborate cognitive processing, sufficient to modify its more elaborate 
structure (Greenwald & Banaji, 1989). However, we surmise that the impact of explanatory 
introspection might be yet more pronounced when peripheral traits are pondered, subject to the 
caveat that self views on peripheral traits will initially be less extreme (Sedikides, 1993, 1995). 
We would also like to address a potential limitation of our research that pertains to a 
boundary condition in Experiment 2. In particular, participants in the Mental condition of 
Activity Type were instructed to take a few minutes to think about reasons. In this control 
condition, the effects of explanatory introspection were absent, compared to the experimental 
(Written) condition, where they were present. Although informal observation and exit interviews 
satisfied us that participants in the Mental condition took the task seriously (i.e., they seemed 
attentive to instructions and contemplative during the allotted introspection time), we are unable 
to back up our claim with a manipulation check. Nevertheless, we wish to point out that, in 
Experiment 2, we did show that explanatory introspection (i.e., writing reasons why one does or 
does not possess various traits) curtailed self enhancement relative to descriptive introspection 
(i.e., describing the extent to which one does or does not possess various traits)—and that this 
was, theoretically speaking, the most critical finding. Moreover, this finding was conceptually 
replicated: in Experiment 1, explanatory introspection curtailed self enhancement relative to a 
control condition, and, in Experiment 3, explanatory introspection curtailed self enhancement 
relative to descriptive introspection. The validity of Experiment 2 results is further bolstered by 
the finding that the highest reduction in self enhancement was observed when participants (a) 
introspected explanatorily, (b) about the self, and (c) listed reasons. 
Raising and Lowering Self-Esteem 
Empirical documentations of self enhancement abound. Individuals both affirm 
(Kumashiro & Sedikides, 2005; Steele, 1988) and protect (Sedikides, Green, & Pinter; 2004; Introspection and Self Enhancement  32 
Tesser, 2001) their valued self views with fervor and ingenuity. Happily, self enhancement 
affords many intrapsychic benefits (Taylor & Brown, 1988). Sadly, it is also carries several 
costs, both intrapsychic and interpersonal (Robins & Beer, 2001). It follows that keeping self 
enhancement in check, although it may entail some intrapsychic drawbacks, may also furnish 
some intrapsychic and interpersonal advantages.  
Traditionally, much effort has been expended to raise self esteem—that is, making self 
enhancement the dispositional default (Sedikides & Gregg, 2003). Although self help gurus have 
spearheaded this effort by penning self help books for mass consumption (Branden, 1995; 
McKay & Fanning, 2000), academic psychologists have made contributions of their own, most 
recently pioneering subtle associative techniques (Baccus, Baldwin, & Packer, 2004; 
Dijksterhuis, 2004). The drive to raise self esteem, whether successful or not, has been premised 
on the assumption that high self esteem is a decidedly desirable psychological characteristic that 
has primarily prosocial implications (California Task Force to Promote Self Esteem and Personal 
and Social Responsibility, 1990). However, this assumption is suspect (Baumeister, Campbell, 
Krueger, & Vohs, 2003). Although high self esteem may feel good subjectively, it does not 
appear to be a prescription for objective achievement or social harmony (although see Donnellan 
et al., 2005). Indeed, there are several reasons why not having a maximally positive self view 
might be advantageous (Sedikides, Gregg, & Hart, in press). First, compared to blatant self 
enhancers, people with moderate and balanced self views are better liked, both as individuals 
(Robinson, Johnson, & Shields, 1995) and as work colleagues (Wosinska, Dabul, Whetstone 
Dion, & Cialdini, 1996). In addition, people with particularly inflated self views (e.g., 
narcissists) are interpersonally abrasive rather than constructive (Sedikides, Rudich, Gregg, 
Kumashiro, & Rusbult, 2004). Finally, a general but powerful argument against self 
enhancement is that it hampers accurate self assessment (Duval & Silvia, 2002; Wilson & Dunn, Introspection and Self Enhancement  33 
2004), leading to overconfidence that impairs the quality of decision making in such 
consequential domains as health, education, and business (Dunning, Heath, & Suls, 2004).  
We do not wish to argue that self effacement is better than self enhancement, or that all 
attempts to raise self esteem are fundamentally wrongheaded. Rather, we wish to argue that both 
self effacement and self enhancement have distinctive advantages and disadvantages—perhaps 
inextricably intertwined (Sedikides & Luke, in press). This being the case, raising self esteem 
will be more desirable in some contexts, and lowering self esteem in others: it all depends on 
whether the advantages outweigh the disadvantages. 
Of course, explanatory introspection can occur not only in response to instruction, but 
also in everyday life spontaneously. We consider below two possible contexts in which 
explanatory introspection might play a role, with concurrent effects on self certainty. In one case, 
explanatory introspection takes the form of a deliberate intervention intended to be beneficial. In 
another case, it takes the form of naturally occurring phenomenon liable to cause harm. 
Explanatory introspection as a tonic for narcissism. By definition, narcissists
4 self 
aggrandize, that is, engage in excessive self enhancement. For example, they deny possessing 
commonplace flaws (Paulhus, 1998), objectively overestimate their intelligence (Farwell & 
Wohlwend Lloyd, 1998), and regard themselves as more influential and attractive than others do 
(John & Robins, 1994). Such illusions, being pronounced, put them at special risk of error when 
it comes to making important decisions (Dunning et al., 2004). In tandem, narcissists cause 
trouble for others, perhaps as a direct result of their inflated but somewhat fragile egos 
(Sedikides et al., 2004). For example, they put down those who outdo them (Kernis & Sun, 1994; 
Morf & Rhodewalt, 1993), punish those who criticize them (Bushman & Baumeister, 1998), and 
treat their intimate partners casually (Campbell, Foster, & Finkel, 2002). It follows that reducing Introspection and Self Enhancement  34 
their self esteem might have salutary effects, both intrapersonally, by fostering cognitive realism, 
and interpersonally, by fostering harmonious relationships. 
Unfortunately, narcissists doggedly self regulate to avoid the possibility of self 
effacement (Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001). Hence, the strategy of explicitly confronting them with 
shortcomings is liable not only not to work, but also to backfire. A more unobtrusive approach is 
therefore called for. In this connection, invitations to introspect explanatorily may fit the bill. For 
example, narcissists might be prepared to consider in writing the reasons why they do or do not 
possess a particular set of traits, permitting a dent to be made in their robust levels of self 
certainty (Rhodewalt & Regalado, 2000). Of course, it is unrealistic to expect that such an 
approach would have a long lasting impact on narcissists, especially given the small effects 
obtained in our research. At best, the extent and durability of any changes would be an empirical 
question and would depend upon the precise methodology used. 
Explanatory introspection as a preserver of low self-esteem. Researchers have puzzled 
over the persistence of low self esteem. Why does it not reliably recede when there is objective 
reason to feel proud or positive feedback from others? Several hypotheses have been put 
forward, and some have received empirical support. For instance, people with low self esteem do 
not find their own self generated positive feedback credible (Josephs, Bosson, & Jacobs, 2003). 
They also lack the energy to engage in mood repair activities, even when they expect them to 
work (Heimpel, Wood, Marshall, & Brown, 2002). It has even been suggested that people with 
low self esteem do not desire positive feedback because of the threat it poses to the coherence of 
their identity (Swann, Rentrow, & Guinn, 2003). 
We suggest that yet another factor is involved: habitual explanatory introspection. We 
propose that people with low self esteem keep attempting to explain why they are the way they 
are because the way they are dissatisfies them.
5 Hence, they continually undermine their capacity Introspection and Self Enhancement  35 
to self enhance. Although we could not locate any direct evidence for this contention, there are 
several lines of indirect evidence consistent with it. First, it is already known that other varieties 
of cognitive activity, such as counterfactual reasoning, vary with levels of self esteem (Roese & 
Olson, 1993). Second, the self conceptions of people with low self esteem are known to be more 
tentative and less coherent (Campbell, 1990). This is precisely what one would expect if self 
certainty was being reduced via repeated explanatory introspection. Third, explanatory 
attribution for events related to the self is greater when those events are negative (Weiner, 1985). 
Given that people with low self esteem appraise themselves and their attributes negatively 
(Baumeister et al., 2003) and experience higher levels of negative affect (Leary & McDonald, 
2003), it would hardly be surprising if they also sought explanations for these negative “events.” 
Admittedly, such enquiries would be conducted without the aid of pen and paper, a precondition 
for curtailing self enhancement according to Experiment 2. However, it may simply be a matter 
of dosage: if people with low self esteem explanatorily introspect in their own minds with 
sufficient frequency and intensity, and if they seek reasons for the same problematic traits over 
and over again, then no pen and paper may be needed to bring about the required alterations in 
the accessibility of self knowledge. People high in private self consciousness (Fenigstein, 
Scheier, & Buss, 1975) and in self doubt (Oleson, Poehlmann, Yost, Lynch, & Arkin, 2000) may 
be similarly susceptible to spontaneous explanatory introspection and suffer the consequences. 
Coda 
Asking oneself why one might or might not possess particular traits moderates self 
evaluations by reducing certainty about these traits. This finding suggests a new take on 
Socrates’ famous dictum that “the unexamined life is not worth living” (Loomis, 1942, p. 56). If 
asking this “why” question of oneself lowers self enhancement, then the results are liable to be 
subjectively unpleasant. Moreover, if one’s propensity to self enhance is already chronically low, Introspection and Self Enhancement  36 
then the results may also be objectively counterproductive. If so, then the examined life would be 
less worth living, not more. On the other hand, if one’s propensity to self enhance is excessive, 
then a dose of explanatory introspection may be just what the doctor ordered. Subjectively, it 
may not make one’s own life any more worth living. However, by curtailing one’s own egotism, 
it may improve the lives of those with whom one interacts. Introspection and Self Enhancement  37 
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Footnotes 
1 An obscure impulse towards pedantry obliges us to specify that “average” here denotes either 
the mean of a symmetrical distribution or the median of a nonsymmetrical one. 
2 Our research was an expedition into new empirical territory. We were consequently keen to 
maximize the strength of our key manipulation, and so fashioned it from a mix of reasons 
analysis and debiasing elements, each of which was capable of effecting psychological change in 
its own right. Our chief concern, in the first instance, was to establish that self enhancement 
could be curtailed in view of its potency and preeminence; hence, developing for an initial 
“sledgehammer” struck as the most prudent course of action, as well as that most likely to 
generate a egotism reducing technique of any practical utility (see General Discussion). 
3 The degrees of freedom in our reasons analyses differ from those reported previously. We were 
unable to include in these analyses participants (N = 11) who chose to take with them their 
explanatory reasons pages. It is important to note, however, that these 11 participants were 
distributed across all four conditions of our Target Type X Trait Valence design, with Ns ranging 
from 1 4. 
4 Like most personality and social psychologists, we construe narcissism as a normally 
distributed individual difference, operationalized in terms of relatively high scores on the 
Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI; Raskin & Hall, 1979). 
5 Whereas our experimental manipulation of explanatory introspection instructed participants to 
consider reasons why they might or might not possess positive or negative traits, explanatory 
introspection in everyday life, especially when self esteem is low, may primarily involve people 
considering reasons why they do have negative traits and why they do not have positive ones. 
Thus, although the introspection engaged in would still be explanatory (as opposed to, say, 
descriptive) some of its parameters would vary. We leave it to future research to tease out the 
differential effects of the various possible forms of explanatory introspection. 
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Table 1 
Trait Self-Descriptiveness, Valence, and Importance Ratings in the Pretest 
I. Positive Traits 
Trait  Importance   Valence  Self-Descriptiveness 
Friendly  9.88  9.33  9.10 
Honest*  10.29  10.02  9.21 
Independent  9.05  9.13  8.38 
Interesting  9.66  9.79  8.97 
Kind*  9.80  9.64  9.08 
Modest  7.84  7.38  7.13 
Non conformist  6.97  6.77  6.12 
Non judgmental  8.93  8.56  6.52 
Organized  8.51  8.93  7.67 
Patient  8.44  7.77  6.30 
Secure  9.39  9.36  7.13 
Trustworthy*  10.43  10.10  9.49 
 
II. Negative Traits 
Trait  Importance  Valence  Self-Descriptiveness 
Conformist  6.58  6.90  4.45 
Dependent  6.97  8.28  5.30 
Dishonest*  9.66  9.93  2.20 
Disorganized  7.36  8.37  3.72 
Immodest  7.41  7.11  4.41 
Impatient  7.15  7.49  5.29 
Insecure  7.26  8.14  4.75 
Judgmental  7.77  8.44  4.66 
Unfriendly  9.14  9.03  2.93 
Uninteresting  8.11  9.90  2.18 
Unkind*  9.11  9.36  2.43 
Untrustworthy*  9.98  9.85  1.97 
 
Note 1: Asterisks indicate traits selected for use in the experiments. 
Note 2: For positive traits, higher numbers indicate more trait self descriptiveness, more 
importance to have the trait, and more trait positivity. For negative traits, higher numbers 
indicate more trait self descriptiveness, more importance not to have the trait, and more trait 
negativity. Introspection and Self Enhancement  51 
Table 2 
Self-Descriptiveness Means (and SDs) as a Function of Introspection Target Type, Activity Type, 
Cognitive Activity, and Trait Valence in Experiment 2 
 
I. SELF AS INTROSPECTION TARGET 
A. Written 
    Explanatory Introspection    Descriptive Introspection 
Positive     10.80   (2.22)      12.90   (1.20) 
Negative       5.70   (2.03)        4.13  (2.46) 
B. Mental 
    Explanatory Introspection    Descriptive Introspection 
Positive      12.57   (1.26)       12.37  (1.59) 
Negative        3.53   (1.87)           3.70  (1.53) 
 
II. OTHER AS INTROSPECTION TARGET 
A. Written 
    Explanatory Introspection    Descriptive Introspection 
Positive       11.77   (1.10)      12.20   (1.42)       
Negative        2.73      (.81)        3.53   (1.47)         
B. Mental 
    Explanatory Introspection    Descriptive Introspection 
Positive       12.27   (1.11)      12.83     (.81) 
Negative         3.63     (.85)        4.40    (1.62) Introspection and Self Enhancement  52 
Table 3 
Self-Descriptiveness Means (and SDs) for Orthogonal Contrasts in Experiment 2 
 
    Introspection Type   
Trait Valence  Explanatory  Descriptive  Control 
Positive  10.80   (2.22)  12.90   (1.20)  12.63   (1.27) 
Negative   5.70   (2.03)   4.13   (2.46)   3.73   (1.60) 
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Table 4 
Time 1 Certainty, Time 2 Self-Descriptiveness, and Time 2 Certainty Means (and SDs) as a 
Function of Introspection Type in Experiment 3 
 
 
    Introspection Type   
  Explanatory  Descriptive  Control 
 
Time 1 Certainty  12.03   (2.09)  13.03   (1.59)  13.49   (1.49) 
 
Time 2 Self Descriptiveness  12.31   (1.84)  13.14    (.99)  13.62    (.77) 
 
Time 2 Certainty  12.91   (1.83)  13.37  (1.43)  13.70   (1.51) 
 
 
 